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ABSTRACT
Chernouski, Libby C. M.A., Purdue University, May 2016. Rethinking Reference:
Towards A Holistic Approach to Linguistic Reference. Major Professor: Victor
Raskin.
In this thesis, a review of linguistic reference identifies four entities (speaker,
hearer, term, and object) and their interrelations as falling under the umbrella of
reference. This review brings to light certain underdeveloped areas of research into
linguistic reference, and the second chapter addresses these gaps by distinguishing
between the experiences of speaker and hearer as regards linguistic reference, dif-
ferentiating between the different cognitive processes required by each interlocutor,
asking how the speaker establishes reference pre-utterance, and draws on various
pragmatic, philosophic, and semantic approaches and theories to see how they could
begin to approach for this important issue. A holistic rethinking of reference reveals
that it is both cognitive and communicative, but also importantly engaged in users’
embodied experience. This thesis concludes by discussing the relationship between
philosophy and linguistics and pushes for an interdisciplinary study of linguistic ref-
erence requiring attention in philosophy, semantics, and cognitive studies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It would not be surprising if, upon reaching the final page of this thesis, one were
to conclude that it is neither linguistic nor productive, proving no methodology nor
detailed explanation of any widely recognized linguistic phenomenon. The absence of
overt linguistic ornaments, such as syntactic diagrams, semantic formalizations, or a
single transcription using the International Phonetic Alphabet might further reinforce
the reader’s growing doubt, while a quick skim of the references section raises similar
suspicions, as there appears to be at least two philosophers credited for every one
linguist. But, most likely, a true skeptic would be stopped by the title and, more
specifically, by the word reference, which is featured so prominently that it is stated
twice. It is not even necessary to read this thesis to make an educated guess about
the philosophic nature of the enterprise undertaken herein.
Despite its philosophic tendencies and topic, this is a linguistic inquiry focused
on a widely acknowledged, practiced, and under-examined phenomenon. Linguistic
reference is the mystery of how one can use a term, a name, or just about any
definite expression to refer to particular, actual objects in the real world. Reference
is the name that has been applied to a number of different conceptualizations of this
phenomenon, and it has been overlooked by linguists not in any egregious way, but
simply because of its tendency to involve matters with which linguists are not always
concerned, such as the physical world and one’s non-linguistic cognitive processes,
not to mention the mass of philosophic literature written on the topic, which often
ignores natural language entirely. With these hurdles, it is hardly surprising that
linguists have brushed aside the matter of how words relate to the objects they denote,
contenting themselves instead with accounts of syntactic constraints on antecedents
and domains of discourse (difficult enough issues in and of themselves).
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But surely, any linguistic phenomenon is as good an object of study as another, and
a case might even be made for linguistic reference being one of the most important for
any serious inquiry into language. After all, we study language by its manifestations,
the utterances and uses of language observable day to day, and what people do with
language is refer — to things, to people, to real objects in the physical world. Users
of language do this in order to engage with one another and with the world, and it is
by virtue of successfully referring that we are often able to do anything at all.
The trouble that linguists face when wanting to study this incredibly important
subject, in addition to the lack of linguistic literature on the subject, is the confusion
that surrounds reference. In absence of a definition for linguistic reference that goes
beyond the obvious reminder that words are used to refer to things, one is left to
sort through a tremendous amount of research on the subject that is not only out-
side of linguistics, but which is not always forthcoming in divulging the aims and
assumptions driving the approach. The first order of business, then, is to review the
literature written on linguistic reference, touching on the dominant conceptualiza-
tions of reference in philosophy, pragmatics, and the blurry overlap between the two
in order to arrive at a larger picture of what reference is.
Instead of focusing on a particular type or category of linguistic reference, I at-
tempt a holistic view of this phenomenon that identifies the entities involved, the
relations these entities have towards one another, aspects of reference that have been
overlooked, the various starting points from which we might investigate reference lin-
guistically, and the importance of studying reference interdisciplinarily. Surprisingly,
perhaps, I try to take the unfashionable “one phenomenon at a time” (Nirenburg &
Raskin, 2004, p. 57) approach. By presenting a holistic overview of linguistic refer-
ence and its nature, I hope to bring together some divergent literature on the subject
while also demonstrating its importance in studies of linguistic communication and
meaning. In the end, the linguistic nature of this investigation can be found in my
attempt to describe both the what and the how of a linguistic phenomenon, focusing
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on how linguistic reference functions and is experienced by real speakers in the real
world.
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on reviewing previous conceptualizations of
reference in an attempt to clarify our object of study. Four entities and their various
relations are discovered, and the second chapter focuses on a particular subset of these
relations, the speaker/term/object relation in an effort to rethink some of the things
we think we know about reference, building up our understanding of the phenomenon
section by section. In that chapter, a distinction is made between speaker and hearer
reference that helps to illuminate some of the areas where understanding of linguistic
reference is lacking and calls upon a few starting options for semantic investigation
into the issue, including a variation of descriptivism, prototype theory, and embod-
ied and extended theories of cognition. Examples of reference are provided in the
second chapter, which looks closely at hypothetical exchanges between interlocutors,
illustrates the differences between speaker and hearer reference while also reinforcing
the conceptualization of reference as communicative, cognitive, and very much em-
bedded in our physical interactions with the world. In the third and final chapter,
I briefly review the relationship between philosophy and linguistics, providing some
historical context to our discussion and hoping to instigate some interdisciplinary co-
operation. In this chapter, also, I make a case for reference as important for semantic




In this chapter, I focus on the various relationships that have been represented by
the term reference in philosophic and linguistic scholarship, reviewing the different
approaches to reference that have been prominent conceptualizations of each relation.
This review shows that the study of reference has been undertaken for many differ-
ent purposes and through many different theoretical and critical lenses, that greatly
influence the definitions of reference that are presented in both areas of scholarship.
In conclusion, I clarify the primary points of difference in linguistic and philosophic
literature on reference and identify the primary referential relationship that will be
the focus of this thesis.
The relationships between language, speakers, and objects have long been subjects
of inquiry. Understanding some of these relationships has been the goal of previous
investigations of reference, largely. The definitions of reference have been many and
— in some cases – contradictory. The oldest player on the field, philosophy, has yet to
compose an agreed-upon, comprehensive theory as to the relationship between words
and the external objects of the world, but philosophers of language have provided ap-
proaches to the subject that warrant discussion. Semanticists have also contributed
to the discussion of reference, primarily in the way of formal semantics, but it re-
mains a philosophically-dominated conversation. As Putnam put it, “if any problem
has emerged as the problem for analytic philosophy in the twentieth century, it is
the problem of how words ‘hook onto’ the world” (Putnam, 1984, p. 20).This con-
versation has not been a clear one. As Richard Geiger (2011) points out in work
on the lexical semantics of refer, the notion of reference has been ill-defined, even
among its most verbose commentators. From the following review, it becomes clear
that this confusion is a direct result of the tendency of philosophers, linguistics, and
other scholars of language to take vastly different theoretical and methodological ap-
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proaches to reference as a result of imagining certain of the relationships covered by
the nebulous concept to be more vital than others. Unfortunately, rather than clarify-
ing their position, some have failed to announce their preference towards and study of
a particular relation over another as explicitly as one might like. To avoid performing
the same mistake here, the first order of business is to identify those relationships
that 1) have been studied in the name of reference, and 2) are able to (and should
be) at least acknowledged in any serious investigation of reference.
Traditionally, which may be taken to mean as discussed within the philosophy of
language, “reference is a relation between people and things, and also between words
or concepts and things, and perhaps involves all three things at once” (Sainsbury,
2008, p. 393). In most cases, then, a definition of reference tends to involve a two-
part relationship between objects and words used to denote them, and it is the task
of scholars of language to understand and define this relationship. Working off of
Sainsbury’s review, we might represent the possible relations to be investigated as a
triangle (see Fig. 2.1)
Fig. 2.1. Sainsbury’s Generalization of Referential Relationships
P = People T = things W/C = words/concepts
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However, to lump concepts and words into one category is regrettable for our
purposes of being extremely precise about the relationships investigated, and so this
figure will need to be revised. Moreover, it is unclear whether and how concepts should
come into discussions of reference without further investigating some domain-specific
assumptions regarding the study of reference, which vary significantly discipline to
discipline. The issue of how concepts in particular are related to words will be largely
ignored in this thesis, (although see section 3.2.3 dealing with prototypes). So, rather
than collecting the relationships to be discussed based on previous scholarship, a
fresh reflection on the nature of reference and the entities involved may lead us in a
profitable direction concerning how to best conceptualize the issue.
Finally, a preliminary distinction must be made. In discussions of reference, a
recurring question has been when we have ‘true’ reference, and when we are merely
mentioning something or someone in an effort not to identify or refer, but to talk
about it.1 Although this review will cover scholars who take different approaches on
this issue, this author starts with the assumption that talking about an object in the
real world is not the same as referring as conceptualized in this thesis as a linguistic
and cognitive act. For now, it can be assumed that we are discussing ‘true’ reference,
wherein the speaker intends to draw the hearer’s attention to a particular object and
through which the hearer will have to cognitively identify this object. Although this
is a severe assumption with which to enter the conversation on reference, it is one
that will hopefully become clearer.
2.1 Term and Object
In order to discuss the relations that have been represented by the term reference,
we must first identify the entities between which these relations are thought to hold.
The notion that words play a role in referring has been vital to discussions of reference
that have occurred in the areas of philosophy of language and linguistics. Therefore,
1As does Leonard Linsky in Referring (1967) and Alexius Meinong in ”Theory of Objects”(1960),
as read by Linsky in that publication.
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our first entity shall be a word (or phrase), or, as I will refer to the linguistic entity
of reference throughout, a term. This may stand for any of the so-called referential
terms or expressions: pronouns, definite descriptions, names, and, depending on your
semantic theory, general nouns. The second aspect of reference that has been with
us since the earliest investigations into the subject is the notion that words represent
things, and so the object will be our second entity. Already, we have a relation that
may be investigated (see Fig. 2.2).
Fig. 2.2. Primary Referential Relation O = object T = term
From the time of Aristotle until the rise of pragmatic linguistics, reference was
primarily conceptualized as this relationship, and those who attempted to investigate
it clearly saw the term/object relationship as needing attention if not always explana-
tion. This conceptualization was and still is prominent in most philosophical works,
primarily within the analytic tradition, in which reference has been described and
studied as the relationship that terms have to objects. In such scholarship, the term
is seen to be denoting, or referring, to real world entities (Bach, 2008). Assuming
an acontextual position, many philosophers before the 1960s can be seen to provide
accounts of this relation of reference that attempted to bypass (in their accounts, if
not in practice) any speaker involvement. For many philosophers of language, the
emphasis the discipline and its origins in logic placed on formalization guided their
concerns with reference. The need for clarifying and interpreting the relationship that
terms have to objects found in the impetus of logicians and formal semanticists to rep-
resent natural language propositions formally in order to determine their truth-value.
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Propositions, of course, being about particular objects, against which the world could
then be compared. Given this depiction of reference as the relationship(s) between
objects and terms, many ways in which these relationships can be investigated within
formal systems of symbolization have been devised.
The notion of the object, however, has been an area lacking in clarity, and debates
have formed over whether or not terms are related to either real-world entities or
conceptual objects — or both. Philosophers and linguists have differed greatly on the
kind of objects dealt with under a theory of reference, and often must navigate areas
of epistemology beyond the scope of this thesis. Ultimately, a complete theory of
reference would have a place for all kinds of objects, including abstract and fictional
referents. For now, however, it is simplest to take Putnam’s (1984) formulation of
the problem as that of “how words ‘hook onto’ the world” and restrict ourselves
to reference concerning physical objects, for reasons that should become clearer in
the second chapter. This is not because the acts of referring to physical objects or
conceptual, abstract, or fictional objects are inherently different, but because this
thesis focuses on referring as a cognitive act, which also claims that physical referents
are an important part of that process. As mentioned previously, an assumption that
referring is different from mentioning or speaking ‘about’ something or someone is
being made here, and physical objects are things which we can very clearly identify
as being referred to in discourse, on account of our ability to interact with these
objects in particular ways in response to an utterance.
Key to understanding the referential behavior of terms has been the notion of
singularity (or uniqueness) of the object to which a term refers, meaning that a
referential term is understood to pick out only one, particular object (or potentially
group of objects) in any given utterance. Following this train of thought, an expression
is said to refer or to have reference when it selects a unique object or entity – the
referent – either physical or conceptual, depending on who you ask (Bach, 2008, and
Sainsbury, 2008). Proper names and pronouns are expressions that are thought to be
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most certainly referential. For example, in the following utterance, the proper name
Jessie could be said to refer to an individual who is, in fact, Jessie.
(1) Jessie came to the party.
It is clear that, when used in everyday conversation, proper names are understood
by speakers as referring to particular individuals, despite the fact that many people
have the same names. This is because proper names, like definite descriptions, are
notably singular expressions, meaning they are understood by speakers as denoting
only one, particular object at a time. Although names are the iconic example of
referring expressions (or, expressions used to refer), all referential terms are supposed
to contain an element of singularity. While polysemy is a fact of natural language,
it is understood in any exchange between speakers that one is intending to refer to
a particular object or person. Despite the fact that words have multiple meanings
and applications, it is the case that a speaker intends to refer to a particular thing
with any referential term, thus the notion of singularity in reference. So, although we
may occasionally be vague in our use of a referential term, or there may be multiple
ways of interpreting a term’s reference (see Chapter 2 for more details on interpreting
reference), there is the intention and mutual understanding that a term is being
used singularly. In other words, it might be said that there is one answer to the
question, to what is this term referring? in any given discoursal context. If one had
a list of possible meanings or referents that the speaker might have intended, they
would be looking for the ‘right’ one. Singularity, then, does not describe a one-to-one
correlation between terms and objects, but rather describes the way that such terms
are used to refer to particular objects or individuals (or groups of either). Therefore,
singularity has been and still is a key component in discussions of reference and in
investigating the way that reference functions.
The philosophical literature has taken the term/object relation as primary, dis-
cussing reference in terms of referring expressions, or terms that refer. Linguistic
accounts have done so similarly. Truly, conceptualizing reference as primarily a rela-
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tionship between an object and a term that denotes or is used to refer to an object is
foundational to studies of reference in all fields, and as such will be maintained here.
Before continuing our review of the development of thought on reference, it is
advisable to reflect on the phenomenon as conceptualized so far. The two entities
already identified are term and object. But clearly, there is more work to be done.
This relationship cannot be investigated alone without some serious assumptions and
ad-hoc gap-filling. In determining what the referent, or object, of a term is, we
must assume a speaker, a language user who is putting forward a proposition or for
whom a term seems to hold a certain relationship to an object. Conceptualizing
the term/object relationship as one outside of and independent of the speaker is
naive and, for our own linguistic interests, does not tell us how reference works, i.e.
how it is accomplished or used. The various investigations into this relationship
— with the obvious exception being Aristotle’s theory of signification, wherein he
maintains an more or less inherent relation between a term and object2 — show that
conceptualizing this relationship only and independently of the users of language is
not only misleading, but inaccurate.
2.2 Speaker, Term, and Object
The entity that must be added to our account of reference, then, is a user of
language. By looking beyond the term and object toward the speaker, we are ap-
proaching Sainsbury’s (2008) generalization about reference as involving relationships
between people, concepts, words, and things — in roughly any order or configuration.
In the philosophical literature, debates around how to determine the referent of
a term as used in any given proposition. Generally speaking, there have been two
philosophical camps that have dominated the discussion of reference in philosophy:
descriptivism and referentialism. Both camps have differing ideas about how terms
and objects are connected, and both assume, on some level, a third entity — the
2See Carson (2003) for a review of Aristotle’s philosophy of language and reference.
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speaker — empowering this user of language to differing degrees. These two camps
take sides when it comes to accounting for the descriptive content of a term and its
role in determining reference.
2.2.1 Referentialism
The first camp is the closer to classic conceptualizations of reference as a relation
between terms and the objects they denote, but we will quickly see how this approach
raises questions that redirect our attention to some of the other possible relationships.
Sometimes called the non-descriptivist or referentialist camp, this first position
denies that any descriptive content or sense (coined by Frege (1892)) of a word me-
diates the relationship between a lexical item and a referent, or rather, a term and
an object. Approaches that fall within this camp are Millianism and causal theo-
ries of reference (Kripke 1972; 1977). Kallestrup provides this concise depiction of
referentialism: “according to referentialism, referring terms are directly referential”
(2012, p. 53). This definition illustrates the fog that so often surrounds definitions of
reference, but it also emphasizes the importance of referents in determining meaning.
The meaning of a term, for referentialists, is thus wrapped up only in its referent,
and so “to understand Aristotle is to know of Aristotle that the name Aristotle refers
to him” (Kallestrup, 2012, p. 36).
In this approach, meaning and referent are the same. The pros of this theory in
terms of this discussion are not negligible. In this approach, “competently under-
standing the term need not involve any knowledge of that description” (Kallestrup,
2012, p.37) that one could give Aristotle or any other object. Because terms re-
fer directly to their referents, it follows that understanding consists in interlocutors
‘picking out’ the correct referents, regardless of their descriptive knowledge.
Although referentialism is a fair starting point for discussing how people commu-
nicate, it gets a bad rap, particularly in comparison with descriptivism. One reason
for this is because of the following referentialist principle as stated by Kallestrup
12
(2012): “If the sentence ‘S believes that a is F’ is true and a = b, then the sentence
‘S believes that b is F’ is also true.” Since sentences are understood by many formal
semanticists and philosophers of language as propositions that can have either true
or false values, determining the truth-value of statements such as these becomes an
important endeavor. The principle above predicts that the following two sentences in
(2) borrowed from Kallestrup (2012) have identical truth values.
(2) a. Anna believes that water is wholesome.
b. Anna believes that H2O is wholesome.
According to a referentialist analysis, water and H2O have the same referents,
and therefore the propositions in (2a) and (2b) should be identical. The common
criticism here is, of course, that Anna may not believe that H2O is wholesome if she
does not know what H2O is. So, regardless of the co-referential nature of water and
H2O for most users of language, (2a) can be true while (2b) can be false.
But this criticism is really an epistemic disagreement that makes clear the contex-
tual nature of language. If we say that (2a) and (2b) have the same propositional truth
value, all this means is that we are judging the truth value of these propositions based
on our third-party knowledge of these terms, namely that they are co-referential. If
we are judging these sentences as possibly having opposite truth values because Anna
does not know that these terms are co-referential, we are privileging her knowledge. So
the criticism, while bringing to light an important distinction between an individual
speaker’s knowledge and third-party agreement, does not undermine referentialism;
the situation brought to light in (2) merely requires us to select a particular epistemo-
logical viewpoint. In doing so, it also illustrates the impossibility of escaping users’
engagement in reference. In order to judge a truth-value, we must select a viewpoint
of either an individual speaker or a community of speakers. Moreover, constricting
meaning to a term’s referent relies on an identification of the referent that can only
be accomplished by an individual or group.
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The water/H2O criticism or puzzle
3 within referentialist approaches to proposi-
tional content has been criticized by more use-oriented scholars of language, philoso-
phers among them. Quine (1960) notably examined his fellow philosophers’ approach
to both meaning as reference and analysis of propositions, claiming that “an expres-
sion’s meaning (if we are to admit such things as meanings) is not to be confused
with the object, if any, that the expression designates” (p. 184), while also claiming
that philosophers should be cognizant of the differences between a sentence and a
proposition, the later having everything to do with the attitudes of a speaker. He
maintained that “allowing each such proposition itself to remain steadfastly true or
false without respect to persons” was to confuse aspects of natural language that
should be acknowledged in any truth-value analysis (p. 176). Quine was not the only
one to bring speakers to the forefront of discussions about reference, distressing over
in the notion abstract, decontextualized propositions. Those who were, as Quine,
brought up in the analytic tradition began to acknowledge the necessity of context
in any type of referential analysis, though others had no problem conceiving of a
speaker-less proposition.
Referentialism has been most popular and functional as a conceptualization of
nominal reference, specifically, as one is often hard-pressed to think of any descriptive
content that a name might possess. But this did not keep opponents of referentialism
from trying to prove otherwise.
2.2.2 Descriptivism
Those who held that names and other referring expressions make their reference
through descriptive content more (Strawson, 1960) or less (Frege, 1892) knowingly
introduced speakers to the equation, recognizing that reference, as a relationship
between terms and objects, also involves speakers, who use the descriptive content of
3This puzzle is not that different from Putnam’s (1973) Twin Earth thought experiment, which he
uses to demonstrate the importance of accounting not just for speakers, but for the external world
to which they refer.
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lexical items to pick out the referent. As the classic example of such a position, the
name Aristotle in (3) refers to the person who was Aristotle only via some descriptive
content – such as that suggested in the predicate of (3) – of the name that matches
the properties held by the referent, Aristotle himself.
(3) Aristotle wrote Rhetoric.
How exactly we agree upon which properties of a referent are necessary in order
to successfully refer is an area of contention among descriptivists. Though working in
different times, philosophers Bertrand Russell and John Searle are two descriptivists
who presented very different views on how the properties of a referent contribute to
reference as well as on the nature of these properties themselves, reflecting different
notions of the kind of descriptive content that is relevant for reference. Russell has
advocated for one, vital property of a referent as being necessary and sufficient for a
name like Aristotle to refer to the man Aristotle (1905). In order for this approach to
work, the physical referent must hold a property that is ascribed to it. The question
then arises: by whom or what is the term ascribed to an object? This is not a question
that is answered as thoroughly as the linguist might like, but one might say that the
speaker ascribes the property to the referent in using the term, keeping in mind a
particular property that uniquely identifies the object. However, Russell does not
dwell on the relationship between a speaker and the term, as it is tangential to his
argument, and so does not offer a detailed account for how one is able to call upon
or engage this property in using a referring term. Instead, he maintains that definite
descriptions are the equivalent of names, from which he reasons that names must
stand in for these definite noun phrases that describe, singularly, the referent of the
name. This leads Russell to conclude that the meaning of the name is a statement
consisting of this vital property. This property, moreover, is really in the form of
a predicate, as Russell analyzed the definite descriptions represented by names as
quantified propositions.
On the other side, Searle (1958) has declared that no single property is sufficient,
and so has proposed that there are clusters of properties associated with a name
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that help interlocutors achieve reference and which aid the hearer in identifying the
speaker’s intended referent, such as the man Aristotle. For Searle, it is the speaker
who knows some of these properties and uses the name to refer to them. Meanwhile,
Kripke (1972) proposed that there are some properties of the object that a name
picks out that are contingent facts, while others are necessary for reference, leading
to his causal analysis of proper names.
P.F. Strawson (1960) also advocates a more contextual interpretation of utterances
containing referential expressions, seeing reference as an act, rather than a relation
that can be navigated through Russell’s descriptivist approach. For Strawson, linguis-
tic knowledge is, in a sense, knowing how a term could be used to talk about different
objects, and emphasizes the act of referring as a “signal” rather than an assertion
(p. 128). Although neither Strawson’s or Searle’s analyses convincingly manage to
account for how properties and terms are related, they do reinforce the speaker’s role
in linguistic reference, as without him, we have no knowledge of properties and senses
through which to refer. With Searle and Strawson, specifically, we start to see a shift
toward the pragmatic, detailed in the next section.
Whatever particular position a descriptivist holds towards properties, the fact that
there are senses or meanings is integral to how speakers use the descriptive content
to locate the unique referents that match the description. Moreover, reference to the
properties of a referent puts a particular emphasis on the object in relation to both
the speaker and term. In other words, if we use properties to navigate reference,
consideration for how properties are determined, perceived, or attributed becomes
increasingly relevant. See section 3.2.3 for further discussion.
2.3 Speaker, Hearer, Term, and Object
2.3.1 Linguistics and Pragmatics
Within studies of linguistic meaning, reference has played a part more largely
in philosophy than in linguistics proper, and yet, semanticists and pragmaticists in
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particular have begun to tackle this phenomenon in the last half-century or so. In most
pragmatic accounts of reference, linguistic reference is conceptualized contextually,
accounting for the purpose of speakers in communicating with an interlocutor. Most
accounts, then, take the intention of the speaker to point out or refer to a particular
object as a starting point, bringing our list of entities to four: speaker, hearer, term,
object. In using a particular term, the speaker would likely have some particular,
unique referent ‘in mind.’ Often referred to explicitly as speaker’s reference, this
conceptualization of reference has led to definitions of referring as first and foremost
an act, rather than a relation. In pragmatics – and as is believed by some philosophers
of language, among them Searle and Strawson – it is not the words that do the
referring, but rather the speaker, who intends to bring to their interlocutor’s attention
the referent they may have in mind.
The move from reference as relation to reference as act occurred for various rea-
sons among philosophers, but for Linsky (1963), believing that users of language –
not expressions – refer was partly because of what he saw as a failing of descrip-
tivist accounts to explain the problem of ambiguous reference, as no description is
unique enough and no objects have “idiosyncratic attributes” (p. 74). He and other
philosophers who preference the act over the relation often cite speaker’s intention
to pick out a singular object as crucial. Although at times, Linsky (1963) seems to
conflate, in his attempt to illuminate, the differences between referring as a relation
and reference as an act. The topic of inquiry in philosophical studies that followed an-
alytic relation-focused conceptualizations of reference, then, is “at bottom pragmatic,
a matter of inference rather than stipulation” (Green, 1993, p. 14). And so, reference
as an act entered discussions of reference and has been embraced most strongly in
pragmatics.
Reference, then, is an act of bringing to the interlocutor’s attention particular
object(s). Nunberg’s way of putting it is perhaps most apt: “a given term may be
used [by the speaker] to refer to any number of things” (1979, p. 144). Not only does
this definition follow the basic practice of pragmatics as a study of language in use, of
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looking at what speakers do with language, but it highlights the necessity of viewing
reference through communicative intention, as without a speaker and hearer, we have
no way to say what reference is taking place in a given utterance.
As a communicative act, then, speaker’s reference has been dealt with increasingly
in the field of pragmatics and is still a controversial topic in philosophic and semantic
circles. For pragmaticists, the answer to what the ‘correct’ referent of a particular
term, which so plagued the formal theorists, is fairly simple: the correct referent is
the one to which the speaker intended to refer. A reference is judged as successful
when an addressee has correctly identified the referent that the speaker had in mind.
So, “understanding a speaker’s intention in saying what she said the way she said
it amounts to inferring the speaker’s plan” (Green, 1996, p. 13) and is communica-
tively cooperative. Because inferring reference involves reciprocal beliefs and mutual
knowledge, “in modern pragmatic theory ... the capacity to infer speaker meanings
on the basis of the evidence provided is taken to be reliant on the more general theory
of mind capacity” (Falkum, 2015, p. 95). In order to infer reference, addressees must
judge their interlocutor to be rational and cooperative in the Gricean sense, while
also having some shared knowledge and experience.
Given the communicative function of language and the field’s emphasis on users of
language, it is unsurprising that pragmatics and those who take a more usage-based
approach to language consider speaker’s intention to be a, if not the, crucial element in
reference. Despite the speaker’s importance in such accounts, it turns out that much
work done in pragmatics regarding reference tends to focus on the hearer’s inference
of the speaker’s intended use of a term to refer to an object, focusing on the processes
of reasoning and inference that must take place and the knowledge or beliefs a hearer
must have about their interlocutor (see section 3.2.1 for further discussion).
So-called speaker’s reference is often contrasted with semantic reference4, which
is sometimes referred to as linguistic or semantic reference and deals primarily with
determining reference from the semantic content of the utterance or term alone. Un-
4Even if it means to investigate the relationship between the two types, as Donnellan (1978) does.
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surprisingly, the investigation of reference in semantics has often been restricted to
formalization that attempts to account for the various functions of binding and scope,
focusing on the relationships between variables that should explain reference as a log-
ical possibility, not unlike the philosophical accounts of reference. These approaches,
like their early philosophic predecessors, tend to downplay or even exclude the role of
speaker’s intention in determining reference. The problem inherent in this approach
is that it overlooks a few difficulties, as pragmaticists are quick to note, but the
most obvious should be that it focuses on one relation, the object/term relationship,
and attempts to determine the referential relationship without accounting for the in-
terlocutors’ roles, but almost certainly appealing to their own intuitions as users of
language. Of course, this isn’t a fault in the theory itself, as most branches of linguis-
tics are dedicated to studying language as a system, rather than its usage. However,
when it comes to reference, we need to start with a complete picture that includes
all entities involved before determining how to study and understand reference as a
linguistic phenomenon.
While semantic and usage approaches may often seem to deal with the hearer’s
ability to identify the same referent as another speaker, many of these theories do
not apply to how the first speaker establishes reference. It would be odd to say,
for instance, that when a speaker utters the sentence I want the red sweater that the
speaker must sort through the overlap between a set of all things that are red and a set
of all things which are sweaters. But neither does semantic feature analysis (broadly
generalized) fully account for the reference a speaker establishes, since pronouns,
which are impoverished in terms of semantic features and descriptive content, are
used to refer (see section 3.1.2). The significance of understanding how a speaker
establishes reference between a real-world or conceptual referent and a lexical term
should not go unnoticed, although it hasn’t been fully explored in contemporary
semantic theories. Therefore, there is much linguistic and arguably semantic study
that still needs to be done. To do this, however, we will have to look a little more
closely at the relationships involved, a project undertaken in Chapter 2.
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Seeing reference as an act opened many doors of investigation for those interested
in the phenomenon, investigating two entities of primary concern in the field more
generally: speaker and hearer. But in adding two more entities, the relations to be
identified and investigated become increasingly complex. Revising Fig. 2.3 to our
new terminology, we now have four entities that — between philosophy and linguistic
studies — have multiple possible relations to one another, both linearly and through
each another.
Fig. 2.3. Possible Relationships to be Investigated
S = speaker H = hearer O = object T = term
2.4 Conclusion: Relationships Identified
This review of reference has firstly identified the various relationships that can be
studied under its banner while also serving as a reminder that conceptualizations of
reference are clearly based on disciplinary focus, preferences, and goals of the schol-
ars who have tackled this phenomenon. In investigating reference, scholars have been
defining it, prioritizing some of the possible relations and seeing as unimportant or
tangential those relations with which they do not engage. However, it is not often
that the focus on a particular relation is made explicit, and even when clarified,
these different conceptualizations seem to leave little room for interdisciplinary schol-
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arship on the issue that could work towards a holistic theory of reference that can
describe, model, or predict these relationships as they converge and support one an-
other. Moreover, when relations are not clearly identified as the subject of a particular
investigation or field, we run the risk of misunderstanding the scholarship done by our
friends in other disciplines, of overlooking aspects of reference that may be important
for each of us in our own research, and of being unaware of the relationships that can
and should be investigated.
At the end of this review, we have a starting point for further investigation. We
have a depiction of reference that involves at least four entities, and we can visualize
the various relations that have been or could be investigated under the somewhat
vague umbrella of reference as Fig. 2.3.
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3. RETHINKING REFERENCE
In this chapter, claims about the nature of reference are presented that draw on
scholarship from philosophy of language, semantics, and pragmatics to form conclu-
sions about the questions that must be asked about reference and the answers that
we might postulate thus far. This chapter is the core investigation into reference
and 1) identifies a failure to investigate speaker reference as a semantic process, 2)
investigates the importance of explaining speaker’s pre-utterance act of establishing
reference, 3) claims reference is a communicative and cognitive act, of which linguistic
reference is but a part, and 4) proposes a working definition of reference that takes
into consideration the rethinking accomplished in this chapter.
3.1 As Act and Relation
When it comes to the different entities involved in conceptualizations of refer-
ence (speaker, hearer, object, term), it may help to think of the various relationships
that these entities may hold with each other. What ties together the many different
definitions provided in Chapter 1 is the recurring conceptualization in much of the
literature of reference as a relation. However, when it comes to thinking about lan-
guage in use, we may prefer to think of a referential act, and most pragmatic accounts
seem to construe reference as primarily an act. There is nothing in the discussions of
reference as conceived so far that preclude reference from being studied as both an
action and a relation; it is merely a matter of priorities and assumptions. In fact, the
presence of bodies of literature on both aspects and conceptualizations of reference
may be taken at face-value as suggesting that there should be, in fact, a way to discuss
both of these equally valid aspects of linguistic reference. If we are to conceptualize
reference holistically, then, we must account for how reference can be both an act
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and relation. Both of these conceptualizations are useful and necessary and can be
explained with a closer analysis of speaker and hearer reference and the relationships
between the entities involved.
Regardless of which approaches identified in the review are taken to reference –
as primarily an act or primarily a relation – both sides have to be considered, if only
to be refuted, and decisions need to be made about where to focus scholastic energy.
Construing reference as an act rather than a relation brings into focus several aspects
of the context of communication that may not need to be addressed in approaches to
reference that treat reference as primarily an abstract, term/object relationship. It
is those aspects of reference that arise from a treatment of reference as primarily a
pragmatic, communicative act that I address in the following chapter, which will not
only suggest new paths of inquiry, but will, in the end, offer a revised understanding
of the term/object/speaker relationships. Figure 3.1 displays the entities from the
review of approaches to reference.
Fig. 3.1. Possible Relationships to be Investigated
S = speaker H = hearer O = object T = term
In rethinking reference, we must first address a failure in the literature to tackle
each of these relations independently. Instead, scholars often risk conflation or con-
fusion, failing to explicitly identify the relationship that they, as a philosopher, prag-
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maticist, or semanticist, are primarily interested in investigating, let alone its rela-
tionship to other aspects of reference. While this may often be due to an author’s
audience and the disciplinary paradigms guiding their research, this neglect is par-
ticularly unhelpful when it comes to conceptualizing reference holistically. Further,
it has certainly contributed to something of a gap in the research. This gap, shown
in Fig. 3.2 below, is one that involves three of our four entities: speaker, object, and
term.
Fig. 3.2. Relations Underinvestigated in Previous Studies
S = speaker H = hearer O = object T = term
It is not that these entities themselves have been overlooked, but that a particular
relationship between them has been neglected. While speakers have been repeatedly
involved in pragmatic accounts of reference, they have shown up in discussions which
focus more on the hearer’s interpretation of the speaker’s reference than on how
the speaker themselves navigate the term/object relationship. To begin to tease the
relationship identified in Fig. 3.2 apart, we must first do what much of the literature
on reference has failed to do: distinguish between a speaker-centric and hearer-centric
account of reference.
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3.1.1 Distinguishing Between Speaker and Hearer Reference
Pragmatic accounts of reference, in particular, fail to consistently distinguish be-
tween reference as it is experienced by the speaker and as it is experienced by the
hearer when it comes to conceptualizing reference. Pursuing reference as an act un-
dertaken intentionally means that advocates of speaker’s reference should be able to
develop explanations for why speakers choose the words they do to refer to the ob-
jects they do. We do see this in Nunberg (1979), as well as more recently in Green
(1993) and Gundel et al (1993) to a degree, but what is usually discussed is the way
that speakers tailor their use of referring expressions to the needs of their audience
by holding beliefs about the shared common knowledge between speaker and hearer,
or how hearers come to ‘correctly’ identify the referent (see section 3.2.1).What most
pragmatic approaches to speaker’s reference fail to fully explain is where – or whether
– we distinguish between speaker’s reference and hearer’s reference.
In the philosophic literature, much of the discussion regarding speaker’s reference
is an attempt to determine what the referent of a given expression in a particular
utterance is in order to determine the truth value of the proposition. This similar focus
on interpreting reference, too, is problematic because it means that the discussion of
speaker’s reference has largely been either an appeal to a definitive answer of what is
being referred to (as in analytic and therefore formal reference theories) or a pragmatic
account of how speakers help hearers arrive at the speaker’s referent. In other words,
neither has terribly much to say about the speaker ’s relationship with a term they
use to identify a referent — except by appealing to the hearer. Just because we are
discussing the importance of the speaker’s referent does not mean that we have been
addressing what speaker’s reference might actually be and how it is established. To
do so will help clarify some of the otherwise muddled discussions.
The following image of reference arises from our review of reference as both an
act and relation, as well as the rethinking of reference we have undertaken thus far in
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the chapter. Consider Fig. 3.3, below, in which a distinction between speaker’s and
hearer’s reference has been made.
Fig. 3.3. Distinguishing between Speaker and Hearer reference
S = Speaker H = Hearer O = object T = term
Figure 3.3 is a representation of the relationships between several of the entities
that we have focused on thus far. In particular, however, we have a figure here that
purports to describe the relationships between these entities in a way that does what
previous studies have not always done clearly: detail the different relationships and
experiences that speakers and hearers have at any given moment in discourse when
a referential term is employed, albeit in a way that idealizes the process, resulting in
some simplifications. The insight of this visualization is twofold: 1) reference can be
seen to be an act for both the speaker and the hearer (albeit two incredibly different
acts), and 2) there is a relation that follows from these two acts. Here, already, we
have reference conceptualized as both an act and relation. There is more, however,
represented here, by nature of the figure’s claim to represent what actually occurs
during linguistic communication.
In Fig. 3.3, the speaker (S) has two associations represented by lines between
(S) and both (T) and (O). As the lines indicate, (S) has — and must have, in this
hypothetical instance of linguistic reference — a relationship with both the term (T)
used to refer and with the object (O) that the speaker wants to refer to (or intends
to identify). But the two relationships the speaker has here can also be thought of as
representing two different types of associations. On the one hand, we have a line that
we could call semantic, since it has to do with (S)’s knowledge of their language, of the
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terms used to refer (whatever might be entailed therein). The other line illustrates the
association a speaker has with an object, or rather, their ontological or encyclopedic
knowledge of the referent itself.
What we have with the hearer (H) is similar. The hearer (H), as a user of language,
has similar associations to those the (S) has: they have semantic knowledge of the
term (T), and they (presumably) have some ontological or encyclopedic knowledge
of (O), however impoverished at the moment of communication. The processes of
putting together (O) with (T) is one of a primarily pragmatic nature, as discussed in
the previous section, wherein, as thoroughly discussed in the literature on speaker’s
reference, (H) is able to discern or identify the (O) of the (S) with the assistance of
the (T) used by the speaker.
(S) and (H) have two very different relationships to the (T), the referring expres-
sion. Notably, it seems as though the speaker has to establish reference as a relation
pre-utterance, and their association with (O) occurs prior to their association with
(T), as the speaker knows the object to which they want to refer before deciding on a
term to use. The only possible relation (H) can have to this particular substantiation
of (T) is post-utterance, after they’ve heard the speaker, when they are then able
to interpret the speaker’s intended referent. Thus, it is (H)’s knowledge of (T), the
referring expression itself — along with pragmatic reasoning — which enables (H) to
pick out the (O) the speaker is referring to.
It is important to note here the simplifying nature of the figure. Although the
associations that (S) and (H) have with the (T) and (O) are labeled identically, this
should not be taken to imply that (S) and (H) have identical semantic and encyclope-
dic knowledge, nor are their associations are in any way necessarily similar. They are
merely the resources each individual draws on when establishing and interpreting ref-
erence, and although some similarity will be required for successful reference (in other
words, (S) and (H) cannot have completely different semantic understanding of (T),
or (H) will most likely fail to identify (S)’s reference), each interlocutor’s knowledge
and associations will be different.
27
The cognitive and linguistic processes of the speaker and hearer involved in any
instance of linguistic reference, then, are very different. However, it is also clear that
both interlocutors are involved in an act of communication, linguistic and cognitive,
involved in relating (T) to (O). The nearness of (T) and (O) in this illustrations are
meant to indicate their performed relation, in other words, the mutual recognition
by (S) and (H) of the connection between the (T) and the (O). Note that in this
illustration, (T) and (O) relate to both (S) and (H), but do so differently. Here,
mutual recognition is not a necessary condition for the referential act, per se, and
it would still be a performative action if (S) were to establish that relation between
(T) and (O), but a ‘misfire’ if (H) were to identify a different (O). So, while (S)
and (H) may both have previous encounters with and knowledge (both encyclopedic
and semantic) of (T) and (O), the connection between them is forged in the act of
communication. This relation, however, is very real for the interlocutors and is a
necessary condition for successfully communication based on mutual understanding.
This is not to say that there are not so-called referring expressions, such as names,
which members of a linguistic community take to be static in their reference, nor to
say that all terms can be used (successfully) to refer to any object. It is simply to
point out that reference, as an act, is one of establishing a relation between (T) and
(O).
This relation of (T) and (O) as it is performed in an act of linguistic communica-
tion is the one I’ve chosen to call reference, as it most closely resembles traditional
conceptualizations involving a relation between an object and a term used to refer to
it. Thus, we can keep the conceptualization of reference as primarily a relation. The
important difference, however, is that we can only have this relation through either
(S) or (H).
The role that (S) and (H) play in reference as a relation becomes obvious upon
further reflection on reference as an act and the figure above, which claims that
the relations or associations that (S) and (H) hold to the (T) and (O) occur at
different times (pre- or post-utterance) and in different orders (encyclopedic and then
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semantic association, or vice versa). We must also keep in mind the various accounts
of reference we have already reviewed, primarily those pragmatic accounts that focus
on speaker’s reference.
Considering speaker’s reference requires us to think of the intention on the part
of (S) to use (T) to refer to (O). As (S) is the first player in this game of reference,
they have the primary job of establishing reference, choosing the term with which
to refer to the object. (S), then, establishes reference — the relation — with their
utterance. What we also know from pragmatic investigations of reference is that it
is the hearer’s job to then infer the object, or referent. What we should say, then,
is that (H) interprets not the object first, but the relation of reference that (S) has
established between (T) and (O) in order to identify the object. Though they may
be acquainted with the object, they will not identify it as the speaker’s referent pre-
utterance. It is this relation that (H) interprets. Therefore, (H) negotiates (S)’s
reference by perceiving the relationship between (O) and (T) that (S) has already
made salient through (S)’s utterance. Because of (H)’s semantic knowledge and their
encyclopedic or ontological knowledge or acquaintance with the referent, (H) is able
to perceive the relation that (S) has performed through their act of establishing
reference. For (H), the intended audience, it is not their own intention which relates
(T) to (O), but rather, their perception of (S)’s intention, which is ultimately the
perception of a relation forged between (O) and (T) by (S). So, although both acts
performed by (S) and (H) are pragmatic in part, they also both involve a great deal
of semantic or linguistic knowledge of terms and their use.
Reference, then, is as much an act as it is a relation, but as a communicative
phenomenon, it is vital to understand this act in the context both speaker and hearer.
But the different aspects of the speaker and hearer’s actions and the order in which
they process the relationships between term and object require further research and
theorizing.
Speaker’s reference, as an act of establishing, presents an interesting challenge; a
theory of reference must account for how (S) selects the term in relation to the object
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to which (S) wishes to refer. As is illustrated in the figures by the numbering of
the semantic and encyclopedic relations, (S) will first be acquainted with the object
(O), and consequently use their semantic (and pragmatic) knowledge to select an
appropriate term post-referent identification. (H), on the other hand, must proceed
inversely, first exposed to the term, which requires (H) to use semantic knowledge,
and then to the (O) through a process of inference that includes semantic knowledge.
This temporal sequence of events or processes is, of course, a natural fact of lan-
guage in use.1 Chomsky has said that approaches that suppose “that the speaker
selects the general properties of sentence structure before selecting lexical items (be-
fore deciding what he is going to talk about) ... [seem] not only without justification
but entirely counter to whatever vague intuitions one may have about the processes
that underlie production” (Chomsky, 2006, p. 139). We need, therefore, to account
for the fact that the speaker first decides what to say. And while the process of inter-
pretation on the part of the hearer has been discussed extensively in the literature,
relatively little attention has been given to the speaker’s act of establishing reference.
Figure 3.4 has been revised to depict the order of the sequenced act that is reference
for the speaker (though no causal relation is intended, per se).
The distinctions made above may seem trivial, and the image used to represent
these relations is certainly rough, but it illustrates an area of some confusion in the
literature and one way we might better differentiate between reference as act and
relation, as well as the referential experiences of both speaker and hearer.2 The exact
terminology and depiction provided are not meant to replace previous terms or illus-
trations, but it is one way of handling this vital distinction that makes distinguishing
1Eriksson (2009) suggests that a reference takes place in a communicative “sequence” of interactions
between interlocutors, involving both ostensive and linguistic acts of reference.
2Edouard Morot-Sir offers an account of reference as neither a relation nor an act, but rather as
an experience in The Imagination of Reference (1995), and Jessica Pepp, also, provides an picture
of reference that likens language to a form of perception in her dissertation, “Locating Semantic
Reference” (2012). Pepp’s account of linguistic reference focuses on language as a way to perceive
and thus experience the referent. Clearly, an experience of reference, in addition to seeing it as an
act or relation, is involved here with an attempt to differentiate between the different experience
interlocutors have in any given exchange.
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Fig. 3.4. Speaker, Object, Term Temporal Relation
S = speaker H = hearer O = object T = term
between speaker and hearer reference a little more tangible. Although this account
necessarily examines reference as, at heart, communicative, we can maintain some of
the original distinction between reference as act and reference as a (performed) rela-
tion by working from the perspective of either speaker or hearer, as discussed above.
Moreover, this illustration illuminates a serious need to examine how reference is
established for a speaker pre-utterance.
But here we need to pause in order to make a vital distinction. What we called
reference was the established or interpreted relation of an object to a term. Therefore,
reference (so conceived) and identifying a referent are not the same thing: reference
is the established and subsequently interpreted relationship between a term and an
object, while identification is the cognitive act of locating the referent in the real
world. Both are important in determining how communication is accomplished, and
it is doubtful that these two aspects — referencing and identifying — can be separated,
for together they provide an account of what is happening when we use terms to refer.
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3.1.2 An Example with Pronouns
To illustrate the conceptualization of linguistic reference provided in the previous
section, a more concrete example should be provided. For the sake of simplicity and
to avoid more in-depth discussion of the nature of senses and meaning at this point,
the examples provided will use pronouns as referential terms. Through this example,
we will be able to see 1) the difference between speaker and hearer reference, and 2)
the need to investigate how reference is established pre-utterance, as described in the
preceding section. It will also importantly demonstrate the necessity of incorporating
extra-linguistic experiences into our discussion of reference.
Pronouns have been an object of study for linguists for some time partially because
of their ability to “pick out the same kinds of objects as full lexical nominals” while
at the same time “lack[ing] descriptive content” (Wiese and Simon, 2002, p. 2).
Pronouns are important to the discussion of reference for precisely this reason. In
English, pronouns are understood to be definite, though exactly what it means to be
definite is also an area of some contention (Abbott, 2010). But, generally, pronouns
are thought to be definite because they seem to refer to a particular object the way
that definite noun phrases do. For example, in (4), it is understood to refer to the
same object as the book, but it does not seem to carry any particularly descriptive
content, unlike book, which could be described in many different ways, usually via its
properties or features.
(4) I bought the book because I loved it so much.
In English, pronouns can carry features for number, gender, animacy (he versus
it), and case. Different “typological-descriptive” approaches have been taken to best
represent and ontologize these features (Goddard, 1995), but we will keep it sim-
ple. The personal pronoun he, for instance, carries the features: singular, male, and
nominative. It is through these features that pronouns are said to do some of their
“pick[ing] out” of particular referents in the world (Wiese and Simon, 2002, p.3).
For example, in (5a), there are two individuals, but we understand that he refers to
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Mark because of the particular gender feature, male, that he carries. While in (5b),
changing the personal pronoun he to she changes the understood referent to Sally.
(5) a. Sally told Mark he would have to go to the store again.
b. Sally told Mark she would have to go to the store again.
The personal pronoun in English carries at least some descriptive content — which
can help an interlocutor establish or interpret reference — by way of its grammati-
cal features. But by themselves, pronouns don’t seem to contain much in terms of
meaning. This does not mean, however, that they cannot be used to refer. Using
pronouns to refer is a slightly different approach from claiming that pronouns merely
‘refer back’ to their linguistic antecedents, which is the approach taken by many lin-
guists (Weise and Simon, 2002). The argument that pronouns are merely proxies for
their antecedents, containing “copies” of their linguistic antecedent’s descriptive and
syntactic content has also been presented (Heusinger, 2002, p.111). Popular during
American Structuralism, this view has since been criticized heavily (Heusinger, 2002,
p.112). But if we accept that pronouns can be used to refer directly to an object,
instead of being a mere copy of the antecedent itself, we would expect this to be
reflected in the data. Take, for example, the discourse in (6), borrowed from Van
Rooy (2001).
(6) a. John: A man jumped off the bridge.
b. Mary: He didn’t jump, he was pushed.
Van Rooy (2001) merely says that “the pronoun [he] appears to be used referen-
tially” in (6b), “referring to the speaker’s referent of John’s use of the indefinite” (p.
624). To a native speaker, who doubtless supplies the discourse with a context, it
is obvious that Mary’s use of he in (6b) is referring to the same individual as John
is referring to in (6a). But, what is more interesting is that Mary is presenting new
information to John in her predicate. If pronouns were copies of their antecedents,
their descriptive information should be the same, but John describes a man who
jumped off a bridge, which directly contradicts the information Mary gives about
him in (6b), when she asserts that he did not in fact jump, but was pushed. By cor-
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recting John’s information, Mary is recognizing the same referent, but she clearly has
different descriptive information regarding her referent. This is only possible if the
pronoun he is perceived as directly corresponding to a real-world object, or referent
(the same individual John is discussing), not by proxy or through some descriptive
content, unless we limit that descriptive content to the grammatical properties of the
pronoun which align with the referent: third person, male, and singular.
This should bring to mind descriptivism, the approach to reference reviewed in
section 2.2.2 that claimed that reference is negotiated or mediated by users of a lan-
guage through senses or descriptive content of a term and the referent’s corresponding
properties. Of course, we can use Van Rooy’s sample sentence in (6) to illustrate the
flaws in this approach. Clearly, John in (6a) was had incorrect descriptive content
regarding his referent, the man who John thought jumped off of the bridge. And
yet, Mary, in (6b) recognizes Johns referent, referring to that same object with the
pronoun he, although the properties of her referent are slightly different. So, we once
again show that the pronoun he cannot be a mere copy, while also seeing the flaw of
descriptivism: the reference in (6a) was not only understood by Mary, but this same
object was referenced by Mary. So, despite the reference being ‘false,’ according to
descriptivism, it was successful in terms of ‘picking out’ the object for Mary.
Communicatively, this instance of reference is complete, making descriptivism’s
push for some degree of matching between a real-world referent and the descriptive
content of the term used seem at best an incomplete account of communication. But
requiring an object to match the descriptive content of the referring term’s sense or
meaning can be shown to be incomplete for an analysis of pronouns even further.
For example, imagine A and B are having a conversation, and speaker A points to
another individual, Mark, who is not in the conversation, saying He is a great father.
Here, speaker A is clearly referring to a unique individual via a pronoun, which itself
has no descriptive content other than its grammatical features. Nonetheless, the
referent (Mark) is clearly communicated to speaker B, who correctly understands the
referent of speaker A’s pronoun to be Mark. But all that speaker B knows of this
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referent – aside from the new information provided by speaker A – is perceptual.
Speaker B can respond to speaker A by saying, Oh, I don’t know him, using the
pronoun him to identify the same referent (Mark) as speaker A, even though speaker
B knows next to nothing about the object that is being referred to. This example
illustrates two things. First, that lack of descriptive content does not prevent a
speaker from using a pronoun to pick out an object. Second, that the actual object
being referred to via a pronoun is an important part of what makes pronouns function
communicatively for speakers.
While discussion regarding linguistic antecedents may be relevant for syntactic
rules, it is clear from the above examples that pronouns themselves can be used as
directly referential terms, and do not, as syntactic analyses seem to suggest, merely
connect back to their linguistic antecedent when it comes to establishing reference.
All this means is that we must look outside of the syntax of a sentence and previous
linguistic discourse in order to understand how pronouns are used referentially.
Let’s look again at Van Rooy’s sentences in (6). We have established that John
and Mary are discussing the same object. This is simple enough for us to see, as a
third party. Imagine, though, the complexity of the communicative event occurring.
Mary, as a hearer and second speaker, must not only recognize John’s object, but she
must do so despite his false information. Then, she establishes reference using the
pronoun he to stand for the same object, and it is presumed (because we understand
her object as being the same as that of John’s) that John understands that Mary is
referring to the same object with her use of the personal pronoun he. Therefore it
makes sense to say that communicative understanding consists in interlocutors picking
out the correct objects, regardless of their descriptive knowledge of a term or object.
Going back to (6), in which John and Mary discuss the man on the bridge, it is clear
that they both identify the same object, although their knowledge of the object itself
differs. So, descriptivism seems to lack some explanatory power when it comes to
analyzing pronouns used to refer, since “all such understanding takes is knowledge of
whom or what the term refers to” (Kallestrup, 2012, p. 37). To discover how Mary
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is able to both ‘pick out’ the correct referent despite having false information, we will
have to step outside of descriptivism and examine the notion of salience.
Klaus von Heusinger, in “Reference and Representation of Pronouns,” tackles the
complexity of interpreting communicative acts involving pronoun reference, claiming
that “pronouns are interpreted as referring to the most salient element given so far”
(2002, p. 109). Heusinger’s proposal of a “salience hierarchy” can help explain how
an interlocutor is able to correctly identify a speaker’s referent and how reference is
fundamentally communicative.
The most salient element in a given context can be either extra-linguistic or lin-
guistic, meaning that an interlocutor may infer the intended referent via either a
clue from the discoursal context, such as a gesture or location, or they may infer
the referent from a recent mention in the linguistic discourse. Heusinger differenti-
ates between anaphoric and deictic pronouns, saying that the prior refer to the most
salient linguistic antecedent, and the latter refer to the most salient extra-linguistic
context, and he concludes that pronouns “show different referential behavior” (2002,
p. 132). However, as discussed above, reference as a relation is establishing and in-
terpreting the relation between term and object. This relation is always mediated by
speakers, but there is no reason to think a term must navigate its reference through
previous linguistic mention. Instead, the distinction between linguistic and extra-
linguistic context (or anaphoric and deictic pronouns) is significant only in terms of
salience, not in how reference happens. A particular referent may be made more
salient through either the linguistic or extra-linguistic context, aiding the hearer in
identifying the correct referent via either the linguistic antecedent or a physical action
by the speaker.
To illustrate the role of salience in interpreting the reference relation between a
term and an object, let’s look at (7). In (7), Mary is talking about John in her first
clause, and her dependent clauses uses the personal pronoun he.
(7) Mary: I wanted to go to the dance with John, but he said no.
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There are several different ways in which the hearer can locate the most salient
object of the term the speaker uses to refer, the pronoun he. As mentioned earlier, the
grammatical features of the pronoun help to distinguish the object to some extent,
because he requires a singular, male referent. In terms of the linguistic context,
he in (7) could be understood to refer to the individual who is John. But, the
extra-linguistic context could change the referent and so, of course, the meaning of
the sentence. Mary may be talking to her friend and, as she utters the dependent
clause, pointing to her father. In this case, the interlocutor would understand the
referent to be Marys father, who also matches the grammatical features of the personal
pronoun. Whether the referent of the pronoun is understood to be Mary’s father
or John is dependent on which referent is most salient, and referents can be made
salient through either a linguistic antecedent or extra-linguistic context. So, although
linguistic antecedents are not significant for the manner in which a pronoun refers,
they do play a role in the identification of referents by influencing salience. Of course,
one may also employ other referential cues, such as intonation or pitch to create
emphasis on a particular referential expression, such as he. These will aid the hearer
in identifying the object, as cues such as these can make a particular referent more
salient. In such a situation, however, the hearer will already need to have some
referent(s) in mind and interpret the marked intonation or stress, for example, as
creating a meaningful contrast between two or more referents or as re-emphasizing
the referent already in play, both of which are surely dependent on context to a degree.
So far we have discussed the relationship between a term and its object via English
pronouns, showing the importance of both linguistic and extra-linguistic salience in
the hearer’s process of interpreting this relationship. But it has not yet been discussed
how it is that speakers link terms with their objects. Academic energy has been
well spent discussing the hearers interpretation of a pronoun and identification of a
referent, but we must also examine how a term can be and is used by a speaker to
refer to a particular object in the first place. Moreover, we are not able to account
for the extra-linguistic discoursal context other than by salience, which is lacking in
37
specificity regarding the nature of extra-linguistic experience and its relation to both
interlocutors and the language they use.
The next two sections will tackle these issues.
3.2 Establishing Linguistic Reference Pre-Utterance
As the previous section illustrated, there is still much to be investigated regarding
reference as both an act and relation. One of the primary concerns that arose was how
to deal with the speaker’s process of selecting a term by which to refer to an object,
with which they are already associated pre-utterance. The possible accounts for
establishing linguistic reference pre-utterance are explored below in relatively general
way, reviewing what we might make use of in pragmatic, philosophic, and semantic
accounts, if only because “awareness of ones options is a good start toward creating
better theories” (Raskin, 1985, p. 50). Although the approaches in this section are
suggested starting points, they are not rigorously applied, and so each subsection
presents a very general idea about how one might proceed to investigate reference,
based on previous research, which leads to some simplification and idealization of
both the theories and their suggested applications to reference.
3.2.1 Pragmatically
Pragmaticists view reference as an act, and the relationship between term and ob-
ject is always mediated by the interlocutor’s beliefs and knowledge about both things
and people. In order to successfully communicate, the hearer must be able to infer
the speaker’s intended referent based on their knowledge and beliefs. Nunberg says
that an assumption of rationality and cooperation between interlocutors “assumes
that they must identify everything in such a way as to maximize the possibility of
successful reference” (1979, p. 167). In other words, there is a lot of reasoning about
people going on behind the scenes when we communicate. Despite the fact that we
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are able to accomplish this successfully and with little cognitive effort on a regular
basis, research has shown that it is actually quite a complex process of collaboration.
Regardless if we are examining reference from the speaker’s or the hearer’s point of
view, reference “involves the cooperative exploitation of supposed mutual knowledge”
(Green, 1996, p. 47), whether that knowledge be linguistic or otherwise, and presum-
ably both. Whether in producing an utterance that is meant to bring a particular
referent to the addressee’s attention or in interpreting the referent to which an ad-
dressee believes the speaker to be referring, “speaker and hearer rely on assumptions
about each other’s goals and beliefs to reconstruct intended referents,” including not
only beliefs about the world, but about one another.
On the speaker’s end, considerations must be made about how the addressee will
interpret the referring term, about whether or not they will interpret the speaker’s
intended referent correctly. In order to ensure that what the speaker is saying is
what the hearer will understand, the speaker must take many different facts about
the addressee into consideration. Clark, Schreuder, and Buttrick (1983) call this
consideration the principle of “optimal design,” which “relies crucially on the notion
of common ground” (p. 246). When a speaker is determining how to best refer the
addressee to a particular object or person, the speaker is designing their utterance in a
way that capitalizes on their shared knowledge. In such a conceptualization of the act
of reference, then, the term(s) used to refer “function only as clues” (Green, 1993, p.
14). Because reference is communicative and therefore Gricean at heart, interlocutors
both assume that the utterance is making use of the knowledge that they share of
the terms used, their knowledge about the world, their knowledge about the other
interlocutor, and their familiarity with the referent.
The common ground that interlocutors need to take into account is fairly diverse,
and Clark, Schreuder, and Buttrick (1983) identify salience as a key point, demon-
strating in an empirical study that salience comes in several forms. Salience can be
perceptual, in that a particular referent may be easily identifiable perceptually, when
they are both in direct contact, somehow, with the object or person. Or, it may be
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in terms of previous conversation, what has transpired between the interlocutors up
until this point. Moreover, interlocutors “must weigh every part of common ground
that might be pertinent” (Clark et al., 1983, p. 257). Between interlocutors, then,
common ground is crucial.
From the pragmatic research reviewed above, we can conclude that part of choos-
ing a particular term or expression is embedded deeply in our common ground with
a hearer, and that the speaker reasons through a multitude of factors to determine
what will have the greatest chance of communicating successful reference. However,
what none of these accounts have yet described is how a speaker uses their linguistic
knowledge, their knowledge of the meaning of terms, and their experience with an
object to determine what the possible options are. As pragmaticists will be quick to
point out, the meaning of a term will shift from community to community, and surely
speakers will be taking this into account, but we still have to answer the question:
How does a speaker’s knowledge of terms and their interaction with an object relate
to their choosing a particular term to use?
An explanation of these relationships is firstly semantic, and a complete answer
to this question should allow us to understand and predict how a speaker uses their
semantic knowledge to select the appropriate term to use to refer to an object in a
given situation — a decision made pre-utterance.
3.2.2 Revisiting Descriptivism
To explain how a speaker selects a form, we can revisit descriptivism as a possi-
bility to explain the relation that a speaker capitalizes on when selecting a referential
term, the relation between the term and object. Descriptivist accounts, as reviewed
in the previous chapter, generally claim that reference is negotiated through the sense
of a term and the object’s properties. Reference is thus separate from, but related
to, a term’s descriptive content. Descriptivism posits that “descriptive content is
what determines reference: a particular object is the referent of a referring term if
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and only if that object satisfies all the associated descriptions” (Kallestrup, 2012, p.
13). Kallestrup, who both presents and examines descriptivism and referentialism,
gives the example of Aristotle, explaining that, according to descriptivism, “what
determines whether someone is the referent of ‘Aristotle’ is whether he was the fa-
mous philosopher of antiquity, taught Alexander the Great, authored Nicomachean
Ethics, etc.,” emphasizing the ‘match’ between the term’s descriptive content and
the real-world referent. As we saw in our pronoun example, however, it is not al-
ways descriptive content that is doing the ‘picking out’ for us (section 3.1.2), at least
when pronouns are concerned, although some of the ‘content’ of pronouns — their
grammatical features — are still involved in determining the salience of a particular
object.
Appropriating this for our case, we can consider the possibility that there are
some properties of a referent that are better captured by one term than another.
This doesn’t explain our semantic knowledge of a term and what descriptive content
or properties are when it comes to their being connected with a term, but it might
begin to describe the relation that a speaker has with both object and term. Moreover,
a revisiting of descriptivism suggests that it may be the properties of an object which
influence the term used to refer to that object, working in conjunction with semantic
knowledge regarding the different senses associated with a term.
It seems clear that we need to reassess the role of referent properties and our
knowledge of them in determining both the referring expression used by a speaker
and the interpretation of the referring expression on the part of the hearer. An object’s
properties are going to play a role in establishing and interpreting reference in any
given discourse. There is no indication that these properties have to be primarily
physical, but may pertain to any aspect of an ontology. The key is to recognize that
properties will play an important role in mediating a speaker’s relationship with both
the object and the term used.
In accounting for how a speaker arrives at a referential term to use to refer to
a particular object, then, we may need to account for the object itself and how the
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speaker interacts with it. A descriptivist account, though not a semantic theory
of meaning per se, has a long tradition in philosophical literature on reference and
ultimately suggests that we need to look at the meaning or sense of a term in order to
use it referentially. As the object is the first entity entering into a speaker’s experience
and must be known prior to any intent to refer to that object, its relationship to the
term is significant. We cannot, however, forget to include the speaker in the equation,
or we risk starting back at square one with a term/object relationship devoid of any
users of a language. Descriptivism, then, while not offering answers, does suggest
areas of further investigation.
3.2.3 Prototype Theory
The pragmatic elements involved in selecting a salient term that have been re-
viewed focus on the extra-linguistic knowledge a speaker has regarding their audience
(3.2.1). Clearly, there is more going on, as speakers must have linguistic knowledge
of these terms and their various meanings in order to choose the one that is most ap-
propriate for a particular discourse. Therefore, the root of a question that asks how
speakers establish reference pre-utterance, or how they decide what term to employ
in referring to any object, is semantic. The descriptivist account attempts to incor-
porate the senses or descriptive content of a term in accounting for how a speaker
establishes reference pre-utterance, but opens up the question of how these properties
are related to terms and objects through the users of a language (3.2.2). Building
on our claim that the properties of an object and the role of these properties in a
speaker’s act of establishing reference are significant to understanding the aspect of
reference being investigated — namely the speaker/term/object relation — we might
consider semantic theories that have attempted to take the world into account when
discussing meaning. A general understanding of prototype theory might be a good
place to start.
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Understanding the properties of an object and how reference is negotiated thereby
may be even more important when it is not a name, but a general expression that is
used to refer; the book 3 in a sentence like, Bring me the book on the coffee table, does
not in itself suggest that this particular book has any uniquely identifying properties
— though of course, it must, as a singular object — or at least the term itself does
not seem to capitalize on them. How, then, a speaker assess the properties of an
object in order to decide to use a general term referentially must be explained.
In discussion of prototypes in Cognitive Linguistics, some sense of a term is un-
derstood to be more central than others, while some extensions and polysemous uses
of the term are licensed. In Taylor’s (2006) overview of prototype semantics, he notes
that, as yet, there is still much debate regarding what a prototype is, how it is formed,
and how it is employed. As such, a rather general consideration of its application for
reference will be explored here. Prototype semantics tries to answer questions about
how we categorize the objects we encounter, recognizing that no definition for a given
term can ever fully account for the way that it is applied, and no set of criteria for a
category fully predicts the one language users will ascribe to an object (Taylor, 2006).
Originating in psychology, prototype theory purports that objects are assigned cat-
egories based on their properties, with certain concepts or exemplar serving as the
prototype for a given category, the one against which all others are measured (Taylor,
2006).
Although the precise nature of these prototypes and they ways in which they
are acquired are still debated, it seems obvious that such an analysis of speakers
interaction with objects in relation to semantic knowledge might be profitable for
inquiry into reference. Using the physical properties of a referent, when available,
a speaker can determine pre-utterance which referring expression to use based on
its measurement against a prototype (in addition to other, more pragmatic concerns
regarding our interlocutor — see section 3.2.1). This could add an interesting entity
to our conceptualization of reference.
3Avoiding, for now, a discussion of the role of determiners in indicating reference.
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But a prototype is not really the same thing as the meaning of a term; it merely
explains how we are able to talk about a term as meaning something. However,
prototypes as exemplars of cognitive categories for objects clearly rely on some amount
of linguistic influence. As Nietzsche (1873) says in his underrated “On Truth and
Lying in an Extra-moral Sense,” in which he discusses the categorical and simplifying
nature of language, our application of a particular term to a particular object lies in
our ability to forget the innumerable differences between objects. But, according to
the arbitrariness we’ve built so much of linguistic inquiry around, it does seem that
terms are still not intrinsically connected to the objects for which we would use a
particular term.
So, we need an explanation for how speakers connect a prototype with a term.
A likely contender is that our prototypes may be built by each subsequent use of a
term. As long as a new or novel usage of a term is not too far from our prototype —
by which I mean that as long as the object to which a term is applied does not differ
too significantly from our prototype of that object — we accept it as a fair usage of
the term, and this must be a significant contributor to our linguistic knowledge.
Prototype semantics, then, suggests that one way to account for speaker’s reference
pre-utterance is to consider how the speaker uses the discernible properties of an
object to best match this object with a prototype, which will have a term assigned to
it through usage conventions. Although this discussion may not seem to add much
to either prototype semantics nor to offer a very fruitful account of reference itself, it
is one way in which we might begin to address pre-utterance reference, identified in
the discussion above as a significant area in need of clarification.
3.3 As Communicative and Cognitive
In the previous sections in this chapter, it was determined that reference could be
conceptualized as both an act and a relation, requiring the speaker and the hearer to
establish and interpret the relation of a term to an object. Furthermore, it was deter-
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mined that whatever account we work with — philosophic, pragmatic, or semantic —
will require us to take into account the world and the properties of an object itself if
we are to understand some key relationships and acts on the part of the speaker. The
acts of establishing and interpreting are clearly both cognitive, while the purpose of
employing reference is itself communicative. In this section, the communicative and
cognitive aspects of reference will be discussed, keeping in mind the discussions in the
preceding sections, and will result in a more complete conceptualization of reference
as always communicative, as an act of extended cognition relying on language user’s
bodied experiences, and as therefore ‘bigger’ than simply linguistic reference.
3.3.1 Extended and Embodied Cognition
Cognition has been a primary concern of language study since the so-called Chom-
skyan revolution, though interest in the relationship between language and the mind
has been with us much longer. Whether accounting for linguistic competence, or
as evidence of Whorfian linguistic relativity, cognition’s relationship with language
has posed an inviting challenge. Many of the philosophers and semanticists who
have tackled the issue of reference have placed varying degrees of importance upon
reference as a relationship of term to object and as a contextual act, and all have
begun their inquiry assuming that the relationship of language to speakers is more-
or-less apparent. The avenue these writers have not always fully explored, however,
is how language is itself related to the extra-linguistic, real-world environment, rely-
ing, perhaps, on theories of reference to answer word/world relationships via intense
investigation into particular terms and objects.
Taking a broader look at not only reference, but at language, it is apparent that we
need to better understand the function and processing of language for speakers who
are embodied, whose everyday reality cannot be separated into a Cartesian duality
of internal and external, whose experiences and existence are liminal, involving an
intimately multimodal experience. Chomsky has said that “extralinguistic beliefs
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concerning the speaker and the situation play a fundamental role in determining how
speech is produced, identified, and understood” (2006, p.102). However, most theories
of reference begin by presuming a divide between the internal, conceptual, mental,
intentional, linguistic — on the one hand — and the external, physical, real-world,
object on the other. Linguistic science has, for decades, focused on language as a
matter of inner, cognitive competence. In doing so, linguists seem to have struggled
to incorporate the entirety of the human linguistic experience into their theories –
semantic, pragmatic, and otherwise – of reference. This is not always for lack of
trying, but may rather be a result of the daunting task of accounting for a speaker’s
knowledge of the external world within a linguistic theory (Raskin, 1985).
Although dealing with external and internal processes and objects, reference has
not been examined by many within a truly cognitive approach. The continued di-
chotomy of internal/external has, perhaps, prevented further study into this area.
What that status of confusion over reference tells us, then, is that we haven’t yet
gotten it right, and this might be not a symptom of failure in the intricacies of our
logical algorithms and contextual analyses, but a consequence of our implicit assump-
tion of the division between linguistic competence as encompassing knowledge of a
(still structuralist) linguistic system and performance, application, or communication.
The relatively recent development of Cognitive Linguistics (CL), however, chal-
lenges this distinction, having as one of its foundations the principle that language
is not an autonomous cognitive faculty operating separately from other aspects of
cognition (Croft and Cruse, 2004), and that cognition itself involves external reality
as much as mental activity (Robinson and Ellis, 2008) (Atkinson, 2010). CL is a
usage-based approach to language that focuses on meaning as the pivotal factor in
linguistic production and knowledge (Croft and Cruse, 2004). Cognitive Linguistics,
then, may be a fair starting point for addressing reference, as it purports to do away
with the strict divide between cognition and extra-linguistic experience. That this
Cartesian divide between internal and external is not as clear cut as (largely Chom-
skyan) linguistics would have us believe is advanced most forcefully through theories
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of extended and embodied cognition. Extended cognition, or extended mind, to use
Clark and Chalmers’ term, refuses to relegate cognition to the internal, positing in-
stead that cognition is a physical process as well as a mental one, highlighting the
dependence on “environmental supports” that people seem to use, often humanly de-
signed aids to cognitive processing (Clark and Chalmers, p. 28). Embodied accounts
of cognition are similar in that they claim as central the fact that people are in phys-
ical bodies. The claim, then, is that human cognition is partly a result of humans’
embodied experience with their environment, to loosely paraphrase Leonard Talmy’s
account (2006, p. 544). Our cognitive schemas are a result not only of our physical
embodiment, but also of our interaction with the environment, though researchers
differ in how much stock they put in one or the other (Talmy, 2006).
Much of the work done in CL has focused on linguistic meaning and its relation-
ship to cognition and embodiment (Evans and Green, 2006), including metaphor and
polysemy. Cognitive Semantics (CS), a branch of CL dealing specifically with ques-
tions of meaning, has taken embodiment to be vital to understanding language and
cognition (Evans and Green, 2006). Reference entails cognition with(in) the environ-
ment, incorporating physical referents – be they people or objects (and perhaps their
properties as discussed in the previous section) – both embodiment and extended
mind theories are relevant to our present discussion.
Clark and Chalmers, in their exposition of extended cognition, claim that instances
of cognition extended beyond the mind to the external world are common, and that
their symbiosis can best be described as instances of a “coupled system” (2010, p.
29). In a coupled system, an individual experiences active externalism, wherein “the
human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction,” and, if
one of the two is removed, “behavior competence will drop” (p. 29). An instance of
active externalism can be identified, then, as a time when the external environment is
vital in the ongoing cognitive processes. From the previous discussion of reference, it
seems plausible to suggest that much of reference entails extended cognition, relying
on the environment to help in one of two ways: 1) as providing the speaker with
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the object to which they want to refer, in other words, providing the speaker with
some sensory experience that the speaker assess with his semantic knowledge to best
identify the term to use for the object, and 2) to aid the hearer in identifying the
speaker’s referent, whether through physical embodiment of the referent or through
providing extra-linguistic cues to assist in determining reference.
The very fact that speakers experience life in fundamentally similar ways,4 spa-
tially and perceptually (by virtue of our embodiment), is part of what allows refer-
ence to succeed. In this way, speakers can make assumptions about both the common
ground they share with their hearer and the salience of objects, based on fundamen-
tally similar, embodied experiences. Though this in itself should not be surprising, it
does reinforce the suggestion in the previous section that external experiences must
be accounted for.
But where does language come in? Clark and Chalmers see language as a tool
of extended cognition, the “central means by which cognitive processes are extended
into the world” (2010, p. 32). Nowhere is this more obvious than in discussions of
reference, when an interlocutor discerns a speaker’s referent based on the linguistic
utterances. These utterances project the speaker’s own cognitive identification into
the environment for the hearer to use in processing, ultimately arriving at the same
referent. Using Bertolet’s (1987) language, as was done in the example with pronouns,
we can regard reference as identifying and see that reference is a communicative act
of indicating or focusing and identifying an object, which are surely both cognitive
activities.
Additionally, examining reference as a cognitive activity may help to explain how
speakers chose between equally satisfactory referential expressions when trying to
refer with an interlocutor. Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993) proposed the
Givenness Hierarchy, which suggests that speakers select their referential expression
based on the assumed common ground or familiarity with the referent between a
4Allowing, for the sake of discussion, abstract, idealized (and so certainly nonexistent) speakers,
ignoring the vast variety in human perceptual experiences — an issue that any specific and useful
application of this approach to reference will have to tackle in detail.
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speaker and hearer. The hierarchy itself is claimed by its creators to predict the
referential expression a speaker chooses, and it in part relies on the speaker’s beliefs
about the hearer and partly upon, as others have also claimed, a reasoned analysis
of the context. What analyzing reference as a cognitive process provides us is an
additional – if not alternative – explanation for some of these choices. Certainly, as
the authors claim, the expressions with the least semantic content, demonstratives,
are going to be most useful when there is an immediately accessible referent already
in play. However, if we think of cognition as inherently efficient and as cognitive
processes as competing for finite resources, we can also explain why, when faced with
a number of perfectly good referential expressions, the more efficient option will be
selected after considerations of the hearers relationship to the referent are examined.
This claim needs more empirical inquiry to identify what sort of expressions are more
‘efficient,’ or more easily processed.
While the study of mind in relation to language has been explored through many
different disciplines, even through analyses of the relationship of the environment on
cognition, there seems to be no previous attempts to apply concerns of embodiment
and extended cognition explicitly to reference. However, these seem like two promising
theories through which reference may be better studied and understood.
3.3.2 Larger Than Language
In conceptualizing reference as a communicative act, we have already — though
perhaps unkowningly — determined that we need a framework that begins beyond
the linguistic. As we’ve been conceptualizes reference, an account of non-linguistic
reference would not foil our attempts at describing linguistic reference this far, and
it may help us to further examine the relations to be investigated in any holistic
account of reference, particularly when it comes to distinguishing between reference
and identifying a referent.
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Although it is not always examined in either philosophy of language, pragmat-
ics, or semantics proper, extra-linguistic or ostensive reference is that which happens
without language, but still functions communicatively between persons, or even per-
sons and animals (Pepp, 2012). This consideration requires us to consider reference
as a subject of research that will combine not only studies of language, but studies
of kinetic communication as well.
What unifies the two types of reference — linguistic and ostensive — is the intent
on the part of a speaker to bring to a particular object to the hearer’s attention or
focus. An approach to reference that takes an interest in intent and in successfully
communicating or “focusing” (Bertolet, 1987) an object for an interlocutor must
develop, at some point, a theory of reference that goes beyond the linguistic. The
act of bringing to the attention of an interlocutor a particular object is not restricted
to linguistic means alone, but can be brought about through a number of physical
gestures (Nunberg, 1979; Bertolet, 1987; Eriksson, 2009), including pointing, to take
the most available instance of extra-linguistic reference. Nunberg (1979) also suggests
the need for a complete or ostensive theory of reference, though quite briefly, in
“The Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions,” when he says that “a general account
of deferred reference” is required to appropriately investigate polysemy, and that
such an account “will be concerned exclusively with speakers and things, and will
have nothing to say about words at all” (p. 154). Pointing, gesturing, or otherwise
indicating a particular object are clearly communicative acts aimed at drawing the
attention of our interlocutor to particulars, or objects.5 Clearly, in order to better
understand linguistic reference, a general theory of reference is required.
The need to incorporate extra-linguistic aspects of communication is not only true
of reference, but of studies of meaning, generally, which of necessity must concern the
world outside of the lexical items. Raskin says that: “it is obvious that, in order
5Before we think this will eradicate one of our entities to be considered in reference, however, we
will need to deal with the nature of gesture, which, though not always symbolic, is still one way
reference is enacted. Our question will then become whether an account of ostensive reference can
be conceptualized as anything but an act — as where would we find the referential relation?
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to grasp the meaning of a word, once must move outside the sphere of language
proper” (1983, p. 6). He also claims, however, that “it is crucial not to confuse the
linguistic phenomenon of meaning, of meaningful semantic relations, with the facts
of extralinguistic reality, with which linguistics is not, must not, and could not be
concerned” (1983, p. 6). In the case of reference, we might have to make an exception
to this last claim if we are to approach the subject holistically before searching for
more particular answers. But we must keep this distinction in mind: knowledge held
by the speaker about the world cannot be confused with the semantic knowledge
speakers have about terms and their meanings. How we handle the extra-linguistic is
a delicate matter of where one’s interests lie, but eventually, a theory of both linguistic
and ostensive reference must accommodate the extra-linguistic and, as such, may not
be (and often is not) considered to be part of the domain of semantics proper. As
Raskin reminds us elsewhere, one of the “important problem[s]” in development of
semantic theories concerns “the boundary between the knowledge of language and
the knowledge of the world, or in other terms, between linguistic knowledge and
encyclopedic knowledge” (1985 p. 8). Although a holistic depiction of reference will
necessarily include both types of knowledge mentioned here — as was particularly
demonstrated with our pronoun example — this is not to say that semantic theory
in particular has no role to play.
Taking an approach to reference that sees reference as a matter of determining
a term/object relationship, rather than as an action, for instance, would not require
considerations of ostensive reference. However, for an account of reference that sees
the term/object relation as the result of actions taken by interlocutors, such an ac-
count should doubtless consider the implications of the extra-linguistic in relation to
possible explanations for linguistic reference, particularly when it comes to negotiat-
ing the boundaries and assumptions inherent in any model or theory. What is more,
it has been shown when studying the referential behavior of pronouns at least, we
will need to rely extensively on the extra-linguistic experiences of the interlocutors to
explain reference with those terms.
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3.4 Conclusion: A Working Definition
After reviewing and rethinking reference, then, what emerges is a conceptualiza-
tion of reference that is much more complex than a simple relationship between a
term and its object. We have said that reference is primarily communicative and
cognitive, that reference can be (and must be) thought of both as a relation and an
act, and that determining how a speaker establishes reference pre-utterance is an area
in need of more development and understanding of a speaker’s semantic knowledge.
We’ve identified the extra-linguistic environment as a key player in reference, whether
through ostensive reference or because it contains the object to which a speaker in-
tends to refer and which might play a role in establishing reference, and because
we’ve stated that it is by virtue of the embodied nature of human experience that
reference is successfully communicated. The term reference, itself, we’ve decided to
retain for the established and interpreted relation between a term and object, which
we’ve differentiated from the cognitive process of identifying an object as the intended
referent.
As a reminder, this author began with an assumption regarding the nature of
reference: that talking about an object in the real world is not the same as referring
as a linguistic and cognitive act. After this rethinking of reference, it should be
clearer now why this distinction was made. Reference as firstly a cognitive act that
extends beyond language, though clearly communicative, cannot claim to be present
inherently when one is talking about a thing, generally. Ostensive reference involves
the here-and-now, the object, and generally is done in order to illicit some recognition,
identification, or interaction with the object on the part of the hearer. The key to a
holistic conceptualization of reference presented here is that this relation is one that
is performed in order to engage the interlocutor with the object directly. This is not
to say that the discussion above does not concern how individuals talk about objects,
but merely limits the scope of the claims being made. The question then becomes
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— when do we refer and when do we talk about a thing? This is a topic for another
time and will involve further investigation into the nature of language and discourse.
While this study has been undertaken in the name of linguistics, the many as-
pects of reference identified in the previous chapter foregrounds an interdisciplinary
approach, drawing on the strengths and goals of semantic theory, philosophy, and
cognitive studies, for starters. While the goals of these disciplines differ tremen-
dously, understanding reference as a linguistic — and extra-linguistic — phenomenon
requires us to be more explicit about the assumptions inherent in our theories and
methods, to be open about the relationships and entities we are investigating, and
acknowledging our differences in this investigation.
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4. LOCATING REFERENCE
Now that we’ve explored reference holistically, we can consider its place in the many
fields that have been — or should be — concerned with this phenomenon. In the
following concluding chapter, I discuss the relationship between the fields of linguistics
and philosophy and advocate for an interdisciplinary approach to studying reference
holistically, placing particular emphasis on the need for semantics to address this
phenomenon.
4.1 Linguistics and Philosophy
Philosophers of language have been tackling reference longer than linguistics has
been a science, but their goals are not always aligned with those of the linguist. And
yet, the boundaries between linguistic and philosophic inquiry are not clear cut when
it comes to previous accounts of reference. Some of the most influential scholars of
reference have been philosophers by trade, including Russell, Searle, and Strawson, for
starters, whose works influenced the development of semantic and pragmatic theories.
Their conceptualizations of reference have greatly informed — or rather, pioneered
— linguistic accounts of the topic. Although linguists themselves may not always be
aware of past relations between the two fields of inquiry, it is clear that philosophy
has influenced the primary aims of linguistics. As Harder puts it, the development
of linguistic theory has “been marked by revolutions from above” (2012, p. 1243),
reacting to the philosophic developments of scientific paradigms. However, there are
a couple of ways that linguistics and philosophy differ greatly in their treatment
of language and their goals for linguistic study. Appreciating these differences is
a step towards better understanding between the disciplines and, hopefully, further
collaboration, particularly in the area of linguistic reference.
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As Harder describes it, paraphrasing Austin’s (1970) formulation of philosophy:
“philosophy ... constitut[es] the overarching arena for discussion about the nature of
the world and our knowledge about it” (Harder, 2012, p. 1241). This paints a picture
of philosophy as an ambitious and important field. Because of this meta approach to
any form of inquiry, philosophy tends to dominate discussions of any subject — be it
physics, cognitive science, or linguistics — until a specialized field emerges to tackle
that particular subject (Harder, 2012). The field that then commandeers the area
is one which is “generally recognized as adequate for a particular area of inquiry,”
causing an philosophical discussion to “graduate” to a “systematic investigation”
(2012, p. 1241). This statement places philosophy of language and linguistics in an
awkward position, as it suggests that linguistics will or has replaced philosophy of
language. For linguists, at least, this seems to be the understanding, as very little
attention is given to philosophical discussions of language in linguistics, generally.
Neither, however, is it clear that philosophers have embraced linguistic methodology
or theories for their own study.
As a science, however, linguistics naturally has different goals from philosophy.
While philosophy engages in extensive exploration of underdeveloped topics and con-
cerns itself with the fundamentals of knowledge, “the most naturally accepted goal of
science is the description of naturally occurring phenomena” (Nirenburg & Raskin,
2004, p. 36). Description, here, implying much more than philosophical discussion.
Rather, sciences develop models and theories that can be tested and are productive.
The naturally occurring phenomena that interest linguists vary significantly, but there
are of course trends within the field. Linguistics has been dominated by a paradigm
of structuralism (often credited to Ferdinand de Saussure) ever since its birth as a
scientific discipline. Dedicated to uncovering the systems that underpin language, lin-
guistic science has held many assumptions about the nature of language that are still
being tested and debated, but are none-the-less present in our methods and theories.
Linguists seem, especially, to be banking on the logical patterning of the language
system as a whole, hidden beneath and between the utterances that users of language
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so nonchalantly produce, hoping to uncover and describe these rule-governed systems
with predictive accuracy. Approaching human language as a system to be studied
and decoded, so to speak, has led to many breakthroughs in our understanding of
language and the human mind. With Chomsky’s work in 1960s, it became clear that
a shift was taking place that was not of little consequence to linguists and all those
invested in uncovering the secrets of human communication. Focusing more upon the
users of a language, Chomsky revolutionized the study with his insistence that we
approach linguistic systems through the eyes of its users, using their judgments to
determine what is grammatical in a language in order to better discern the parame-
ters of linguistic competence (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004). Since this paradigm shift,
much of the work accomplished in linguistics takes place within assumptions that
underlie a Chomskyan approach. Cognition has been a primary concern of language
study since competence was differentiated from performance by Chomsky, and it is
this inner linguistic competence of the native speaker that most linguists aspire to
describe and model.
Cognitive Linguistics (CL), however, challenges this distinction, having as one of
its foundations the principle that language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty
operating separately from other aspects of cognition (Croft & Cruse, 2004). Harder
says that Cognitive Linguistics represents a radical break with the earlier twentieth-
century trend of shaping linguistics in ways that reflect philosophical view of what
counts as scientific description (Harder, 2012, p. 1247). With the beginning of Cog-
nitive Linguistics in the 1970s, linguists have been able to work in a framework that
embraces both sides of the language user’s experience. To get at reference, we need to
stray from the more comfortable embrace of language as inner competence and focus
equally on the extra-linguistic aspects of language in use. As Cognitive Linguistics is
one of the approaches to language study that has done this most completely, it offers
a good place to begin, as discussed in (see section 3.3.1).
That many linguists can operate within one paradigm or another — such as the
two (diametrically opposed) mentioned here — without being aware of the assump-
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tions entailed therein, or perhaps they are aware but not engaged, is a testament
to the lack of philosophical thought in the field. Not only does philosophy offer a
fertile ground for exploring phenomena for which scientific accounts have not yet
been adequately offered, but it has the potential to play the role of the watchmen for
the sciences. Philosophy is not “merely another ‘first-order’ discipline inquiring into
some aspect of our environment,” as Lyas puts it, but “the subject in which these
first-order disciplines are themselves made objects of study.” (1971, p. 12). It should
go without saying that such review can only be helpful for the discipline in question.
One of its most helpful contributions could be to linguistic theory, identifying and
discussing the paradigms that dominate the science. Ideally, we should all be philoso-
phers of our own objects of study, to a greater or lesser degree. After all, how can we
investigate a phenomenon without beliefs about the nature of the world, about our
tools for investigating it, and about what counts as knowledge of any phenomenon?
We can’t, and a recognition of our epistemological foundations behind each field of
inquiry would surely be a step towards developing more complete and adequate the-
ories for any particular phenomenon. Nirenburgh and Raskin (2004), in discussing
the state of a philosophy of linguistics, ask whether it should be “a centralized effort
for the discipline,” or rather be the responsibility of “every scientist do the appro-
priate philosophy-of-science work personally as he or she proceeds” (p. 91). While a
centralized effort is still forthcoming, the benefit of a philosophical discussion of the
discipline and tenets of linguistics should be undertaken by the individual linguist,
as we do ourselves a disservice in avoiding the task. If we, as linguistics, conduct our
research with the most scrupulous of methods and our soundest theories, but are not
aware of how the nature of reality and our own epidemiological limitations (or biases),
we run the risk of leaving out or misinterpreting our own data and the significance of
our own research.
Philosophy could not only come to our aid, here, but itself might benefit from
paying more attention to linguistic research. Harder suggests that “just as the find-
ings of modern physics changed the way philosophers thought about knowledge, so
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the findings of Cognitive Linguistics can be expected to change the way philosophers
think about the mind.” (Harder, 2012, p. 1262). As the topics of language, mind,
meaning, and cognition continue to be of interest to both fields, and as we are both
still developing theories and accounts of the phenomena, it is clear that the two dis-
ciplines would benefit from collaboration. Philosophical investigations may still play
a valuable role in linguistics, whether as a watchman for linguistic theory or through
cooperative investigations into those matters which concern both disciplines, while
our advances in linguistic sciences can and should be influential in philosophical stud-
ies of language, if we only keep the conversation open. Lyas claimed in 1971, semantic
theories “open up new possibilities of mutually helpful discussion between philoso-
phers and linguistic scientists” (p. 35), but this advice seems to have been largely
forgotten. This review of reference shows that we are still far from understanding
this phenomenon and that a collaborative approach to reference would be beneficial
for both philosophers and linguists.
4.2 A Case for Reference in Semantics
Reference, as conceived in any of the major relationships and configurations in the
previous chapter, receives little attention from the sub-fields of linguistics proper —
that is, linguistics since Chomsky and in that same vein — and has almost completely
delegated the term/object relationship to philosophers. But this relationship should
be – must be – given full attention in at least one sub-field of linguistics, namely
semantics.
Semantics is vital for studies of reference firstly, among other reasons, because the
relationship between term and object cannot be evaluated independently of a speaker,
and where there is a speaker, there is linguistic knowledge. Semantics, as the field
that studies meaning in natural language, which probes the speaker’s knowledge of
word and utterance meanings, surely has a role here. So, while our interest may be in
the relation between term and object, it necessitates the speaker’s involvement, and
58
who better to approach the knowledge speakers have of terms and their picking out of
objects than semanticists? If “the primary goal of any semantic theory is to model the
semantic competence of the native speaker in its relevant manifestations” (Raskin,
1985, p. 1), then reference surely falls under that umbrella, particularly when it
comes to establishing reference pre-utterance using a speaker’s semantic knowledge,
but also post-utterance, in a hearer’s interpretation of a given term as referential.
A comprehensive theory of meaning should be able to provide answers both to how
interlocutors achieve co-reference and to how they assign meaning to a particular
term. Although it may seem like the prior is the concern of pragmatics and the
latter of semantics, it is clear that both are relevant to meaningful communication
which, after all, is a if not the big question when it comes to human language. As
Harder says, “without a genuine, socially anchored semantics inside linguistic theory,
linguistics would miss the whole point of human language” (Harder, 1991, p. 139).
In order to move forward, linguists need to address the concept of reference and the
embodied experience of speakers, as described here. These are the constants when it
comes to how a speaker establishes linguistic reference and how object and term are
identified and understood by the hearer.
There has been some discussion among semanticists and philosophers about the
distinction between meaning and reference. While some maintain that there is a strict
divide between the two, others purport that reference and meaning are identical in
semantic studies, since what we mean in an utterance is the sum of its parts, and
those parts are often said to be made up of either its referents or the senses of the
terms. Raskin (1983) describes questions about the relation between a name its
referent, “the thing it stands for,” as being subsumed under the question, “what is
the relation between the word and its meaning?” (p. 8). Although this question does
not conceptualize reference as presented in this thesis, it seems clear that concerns
of reference can also be considered within studies of meaning, as the relation to be
investigated concerns speakers’ knowledge of words and their meanings. From the
preceding chapter, in particular, it is clear that semantics, the study of meaning in
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natural language, should have a lot to say about linguistic reference. Whether through
prototype analysis or alternative and more complete accounts of establishing reference
pre-utterance, the study of meaning has simply been refocused in this account, not
unseated.
In keeping with the Chosmkyan divide between linguistic competence and perfor-
mance, semanticists may consider issues of reference outside of their domain, since it
seems to deal with issues of performance, despite the discussions provided here. If this
is the case, it is unlikely that anything I can say or will change their minds. Another
way of putting the issue of competence versus performance, however, is presented by
Harder in his discussion of semantic theory:
Linguistic meaning is necessarily potential meaning — because the meaning of a
word is abstract in relation to any potential use of it. As pointed out by Saussure,
the whole notion of ‘language’ depends on thinking in terms of something that
is not reducible to individual events. And potential meaning must be inside
peoples heads; otherwise they could not carry knowledge of the meanings of words
around with them. The external world, however, comes in every time an actual
utterance is understood. Actual meanings, which are the results of processes of
interpretation, always involve the real-world context in which the communication
occurs.
(Harder, 1991, p. 132)
When it comes to studying language in use, linguistic performance — which is really
the only way we have to study linguistic competence — we must be willing to consider
the speaker’s knowledge of and interaction with the world. Reference is therefore a
perfect area of investigation that brings together both aspects of language and could
provide a promising area for further semantic investigation.
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4.3 Conclusion: Towards an Interdisciplinary Investigation
There is no reason for linguists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists (whose pri-
mary role in reference would be in understanding the cognitive processes involving
perception of and interaction with objects) to study reference independently of each
other. The previous sections have already begun to show the value of approaching
reference interdisciplinarily.
To understand cognition (and therefore language) as belonging both to the phys-
ical and the mental may seem like a misdirected concern for formal linguistics, given
the field’s preoccupation with language as primarily internal. To be sure, the linguis-
tic tenet that language is synchronously arbitrary has likely been a major influence on
the reluctance on the part of linguists to study kinetics, environment, and perception.
Treating language as a matter of cognitive processing, fields like computer science,
technology, and psychology have dominated the interdisciplinary studies of language.
While the study of mind in relation to language has been explored through these in-
terdisciplinary fields — even through analyses of the relationship of the environment
on cognition — there seems to be no attempt to apply concerns of embodiment and
extended cognition explicitly to reference.
The conceptualization of reference provided in this thesis may also raise eyebrows
in philosophy, as it does not leave room for the same formalized inquiry into the
propositions of utterances as has been the hallmark of philosophers of language since
Russell. But, as Caton put it at a time when linguistics and philosophy were vying
over issues of language, “one might say that ordinary language is the basis of all
language” (1963, p.xi), which speaks for the relevance of natural language studies in
philosophy for those interested in artificial languages such as first-order logic. And,
it is likely that as linguistic accounts of reference are more fully developed along the
lines of embodiment and extended cognition, scholars in philosophy interested in mind
may find linguistic discussions helpful for their own work.
61
Given the conceptualization of reference presented in the preceding chapters, it is
clear that linguistic theory alone cannot account for reference, though it has a major
role to play. A study of all the relations exhibited in Fig. 4.1 should potentially involve
experts in not only semantics, but in pragmatics, cognitive studies, and philosophy,
along with any other field concerned with any of the ways that the relationships may
be construed.
Fig. 4.1. Relations and Their Respective Fields
S = speaker H = hearer O = object T = term
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5. CONCLUSION
Investigating the many relationships that can be conceptualized and investigated
within reference studies led to a holistic picture of reference that identified at least
for entities and the relations between them: speaker, hearer, term, and object. Further,
it was determined that reference is best studied as a communicative, cognitive process
in which the relation between a term and object is both established and interpreted,
bringing users of language to the forefront of any account of reference. A gap in
the research concerning speaker’s reference was identified and determined to need
special attention, particularly from semantics, and several theoretical starting points
were suggested, including: descriptivism, prototype theory, and theories of embodied
and extended cognition. The nature of language users’ extra-linguistic experiences
were highlighted, emphasizing users as embodied individuals interacting with the
environment in order to express or determine reference. This approach removed
much of the distinction between internal and external cognition that is inherent in
much linguistic study and suggested that we need a theory of ostensive reference in
any holistic account. Finally, the relationship between philosophy, linguistics, and
cognitive studies was reviewed, and a case for their cooperative investigation into
reference was made. Future researchers should identify the relations with which they
are most concerned, should take as a starting point the nature of reference as cognitive
and communicative, grounded in our perceptual experiences, and should consider
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